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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
It is becoming increasingly evident to human intelligence model builders and theorists that, in order to characterize human knowledge and belief as computer data structures and processes, it is necessary to deal with very large, explicitly unified structures rather than smaller, ununified fragments.
The reason for this seems to be that the original experiences which caused the structures and processes to exist in the first place come in chunks themselves; knowledge is never gained outside of some context, and in gaining some piece of knowledge X in context C, X and C become inseparable.
This suggests that it is meaningless to model "a piece of knowledge" without regard for the larger structures of which it is a part.
If our goal is to build a robot which behaves and perceives in manners similar to a human, this means that the process by which the robot selects a piece of knowledge as being applicable to the planning, executory, inferential or interpretive process at hand at the moment is a function not only of the specific problem, but also of the larger context in which that instance of planning, execution, inference or interpretation occurs.
If, for example, our robot sees his friend with a wretched facial expression, the inference he makes about the reasons for his friend's misery will reflect the larger picture of which he is aware at the time: his friend has just returned from a trip to purchase opera tickets vs.
his friend has Just eaten the cache of mushrooms collected yesterday vs .....
The same pervasiveness of context exists in the realm of the robot's interpretations of visual perceptions: the very same object (visible at eye level) will 18o be perceived out of the corner of his eye in one situation as the cylindrical top of his electric coffee grinder (he is at home in his kitchen), but as the flasher of a police car (he is speeding on the freeway) in another.
This suggests  that  at  every  moment, some  fairly  large  swatch  of  his  knowledge  about the world somehow has found  its way  to  the  foreground  to  exert  its  influence; as our robot moves about, swatches must fade in and out, sometimes coalescing, so that at any moment, just the right one is standing by to help guide acts of planning, infePence and perception.
Marvin Minsky has captured this whole idea very neatly in his widely-circulated "Frames" paper [MI] . While this paper describes an overall approach to modeling human memory, inference and beliefs, we still lack any specific formulation of the ingredients which make up the large, explicitly-unified structures which seem to underlie many higher-level human cognitive functions.
It is the purpose of this paper to define the notion "commonsense algorithm" (CSA) and Figure 7 shows both how to conceive of the algorithm and how the algorithm will actually run.
As a computer algorithm, this is not as fully explicit as might be desired: it lacks explicit iteration and explicit termination criterion testing.
These will have to be worked out before the theory adequately handles repetition. 
VII. LEVELS OF RESOLUTIONS IN CSA'S
The algorithmic content of a CSA can be described at many different levels of resolution.
For example, the "action" "take a plane to San Francisco" is quite a bit higher in level and more abstract than the action "grasp a saw". In the former, the act of taking a plane somewhere is not really an action at all, but rather a description of an entire set of actions, themselves related in a CSA; "take a plane to San Francisco" is a high level surrogate for a low level collection of true actions in the sense of actually performing physical movements, etc. in the real world (things like grasping a saw, reaching into pants pocket for some money, and so on). The answer seems to be "yes", since it seems reasonable to regard enablement as a flow which can be cut off in much the same way as causality.
Perhaps I. Reimplementation of the conceptual overlays prototype system described in (R3) to reflect the new CSA ideas and replace the ad-hoc AND/OR graph approach described in that report.
2. Implementation of a mechanism simulator which could accept, in CSA terms, the definition of a complex mechanism (electronic circuit or toilet), simulate it, respond to artificially-induced malfunctions, and answer questions about the mechanism's cause and effect structure.
3. Engineering of a new total conceptual memory, along the lines of the original one of (RI), but incorporatng CSA's and the new idea of a tendency. This would involve reimplementing the inference mechanism and various searchers.
Development of a
CSA interpreter which could not only use CSA's as data structures in the various cognitive processes, but also could execute them to drive itself. e.,~\e.
Applying

Figure 2
Hamburger algorithm, with actions, states, causality and enablement explicit. Computer algorithm to compute the average of TABLE(1),...,TABLE(N) expressed as a commonsense algorithm.
(NOTE: Initialization has not been shown. The assumptions are that AC3 begins with zero, that ACI begins with zero, and that N and TABLE(1),...,TABLE(N) exist in core.)
